Heritage Intelligence

Mendengar intelijen ingatan langsung tertuju kepada James Bond 007, CIA, KGB, dan Mossad. Institusi intelijen Negara yang bekerja dalam ketertutupan dan menyeramkan seperti kisah Victor Ostrovsky atau novel Body of Lies karya David Ignatius. Intelijen Benda Cagar Budaya (Heritage Intelligence) bukan merupakan pengenjawantahan dari Lembaga Intelijen Negara, melainkan pekerjaan penelitian dan pendokumentasian tentang keberadaan benda cagar budaya yang ada di Indonesia. Banyaknya peninggalan kekayaan artefak sejarah yang telah lenyap atau musnah, sehingga menciptakan kerugian besar hampir disetiap sektor baik dari Ilmu pengetahuan, sosial-budaya, ekonomi dan pertahanan keamanan Negara.
Ketidak berdayaan pembuktian kekayaan dan kerugian Negara tentang peninggalan sejarah, yang telah hilang maupun masih ada merupakan 'titik lemah' untuk dapat menjelaskan dan mempertanggung jawabkan kepada publik.
Sebagaimana contoh hancurnya bangunan di proklamasi, dimana potret nyata detik-detik bangsa Indonesia memproklamirkan kemerdekaannya. Pertanyaan kerugian apa saja yang diciptakan dari kehancuran bangunan proklamasi tersebut? Ternyata ketika di 'bedah' anatominya sungguh membuat kepala cekot-cekot, dari sisi Ilmu pengetahuan bukti nyata keberadaan fisik bangunan sudah tidak ada. Di dalam ranah berbeda seperti contoh ketika pulau Sipadan dan Ligitan diakui oleh Mahkamah Internasional di Belanda, fisik bangunan yang terdapat dikedua pulau tersebut adalah milik Malaysia. Pada akhirnya secara de jure maupun de fakto pulau Sipadan dan Ligitan milik sah Malaysia.
Terperanjat bahwa eksistensi fisik bangunan bukan persoalan sederhana, cara pandang melihat fisik bangunan selama ini hanya dilihat dari 'kaca mata kuda' yang melulu diukur dari perspektif estetika dan ekonomis semata. Padahal sebuah bangunan diciptakan melampaui tapal batas estetika dan ekonomi, sebagaimana masyarakat Jawa membangun rumah Panggang pe Ceregancet mirip dengan jasad hidup yang tumbuh dan berkembang sejalan dengan perkembangan kehidupan penghuninya.

Database Benda Cagar Budaya

Film petualangan Indiana Jones, National Treasure, dan Da Vinci Code, membuat adrenalin penonton terpacu. Kecerdasan mengumpulkan serpihan informasi yang tercecer, sehingga teka-teki dapat terpecahkan dan disusun ulang. Sungguh sebuah inspirasi. Tersebar dan terseraknya artefak benda cagar budaya dari berbagai wujud, baik dari sisa-sisa peninggalan kerajaan Nusantara sampai peninggalan kolonial. Sampai saat ini masih dalam 'terawangan' sebagai analogi berjalan dikegelapan tanpa cahaya. Keberadaan UU.No.5 Tahun 1992 Tentang Benda Cagar Budaya dan UU.No.26 Tahun 2007 Tentang Tata Ruang masih dalam tahap konsepsional, belum memasuki 'ranah' operasional di dalam pelestarian benda cagar budaya. Inventarisasi pendokumentasiaan sebagai database keberadaan benda cagar budaya dari berbagai ragam bentuk, sampai saat ini masih belum dapat direalisasikan. Padahal database tersebut merupakan 'peta hidup' sebagai alat deteksi dini, perihal kelangsungan pelestarian benda cagar budaya di Indonesia. Karena bila terwujud pendokumentasian tersebut, publik dapat mengetahui dan menjaga pelestarian dari benda cagar budaya yang dilindungi oleh Negara. Fungsi database dapat memberikan suguhan informasi, berapa jumlah benda cagar budaya yang dimiliki seperti Gedung, Benteng, Rumah, Masjid, Gereja, Vihara, Pusaka dan lain sebagainya. Dengan adanya informasi keberadaan artefak sejarah ini, penghancuran dan pencurian dapat maksimal dihindari.
Pendokumentasian mempunyai peran ganda di satu sisi dapat menjadi alat kontrol, disisi lain merupakan alat sosialisasi dari Undang-Undang tentang Benda Cagar Budaya yang murah dan efektif kepada warga Negara.

Benda Cagar Budaya dan Keamanan Nasional

Perjuangan panjang Vasco da Gama (1497-1499) mencapai India melalui Tanjung Harapan telah berhasil gilang gemilang, dari keberhasilan ini maka terbuka lebar pintu masuk pelayaran bangsa Eropa ke Asia. Setelah Tanjung Harapan ditundukkan, kini giliran Melaka dikuasai Portugal (1511).
Di dalam kurun waktu 11 tahun tepatnya pada tahun 1522 ekspedisi Ferdinand Magellan dari Spanyol berhasil mencapai Maluku, selisih waktu 57 tahun (1522-1579) Francis Drake dari Inggris datang menyusul ke kewilayah 'surga rempah-rempah' Maluku. Berawal dari rempah-rempah nafsu serakah untuk menguasai dalam wajah kolonialisme tertancap di bumi Maluku, gesekan kepentingan untuk saling menguasai antara Portugal dan Spanyol di Maluku pada abad XVI tidak dapat terhindarkan. Maka keluar perjanjian Tordesillas (1494) dan menyusul perjanjian Saragossa (1527) antara Spanyol dan Portugal. Hal hasil dari perjanjian tersebut Portugal dapat menguasai Maluku.
Kilasan sejarah tersebut merupakan 'rekam jejak' kolonialisme pertama kali hadir di bumi jamrud khatulistiwa, taktik dan strategi kolonial di dalam melakukan infiltrasi sampai menuju invasi dapat ketahui. Fakta penjajahan dapat ditelusuri melalui artefak seperti Benteng Victoria (1605) yang dibangun Portugal di Maluku, berfungsi sebagai benteng pertahanan. Juga Benteng Oranje (1607) di Ternate yang dibangun oleh Cornelis Matelief de Jonge (Belanda). Benteng ini pernah dijadikan pusat pemerintahan tertinggi Hindia Belanda (Gubernur Jenderal) Pieter Both, Herald Reynst, Laurenz Reaal, dan Jan Pieterszoon Coen.
Dari Benteng pertahanan sampai rute perjalanan alur laut kolonial memasuki Nusantara, sebagaimana diketemukannya beberapa artefak kapal laut kolonial yang karam di dasar laut. Dan legitimasi Mahkamah Internasional tentang batas kedaulatan wilayah Negara Kesatuan republik Indonesia (NKRI), mengacu pada peninggalan tanah jajahan Belanda. Dengan demikian 'patok batas' secara fisik peninggalan Belanda, kedepan menjadi sesuatu yang vital di dalam pembuktian wilayah kedaulatan Negara.
Walaupun bukan konteks benda cagar budaya, tetapi masih dalam 'satu tarikan nafas' peristiwa dikuasainya Pulau Sipadan dan Ligitan oleh Malaysia, karena lemahnya bukti otentik di Mahkamah Internasional. Merupakan pertanda urgensinya fisik bangunan dalam wilayah hukum Internasional. Serta perluasan pembangunan fisik didaratan Singapura melalui 'pasir laut', hampir saja mencaplok kedaulatan Indonesia khususnya pulau Nipa dan pulau lainnya disekitar wilayah propinsi kepulauan Riau. Satu lagi peristiwa penghancuran taman didepan stasiun Beos kota, dimana wilayah itu merupakan 'ring satu' zona benda cagar budaya. Kepentingan bisnis lebih penting daripada keamanan. Pembangunan shelter busway dan terowongan untuk pedestrian mengakibatkan dampak buruk bagi bangunan tua disekitarnya. Tercatat sedikitnya empat bangunan tua yang langsung terkena dampak negative yang diakibatkan dewatering saat pembangunan terowongan tersebut, keseimbangan air tanah disekitar lokasi terganggu. Dan keempat bangunan tua mengalami penurunan pondasi, dan dampak negatif apa yang akan tercipta kedepan? Tidak ada yang dapat mengatahui dan diperlukan kajian mendalam. Sampai saat ini kejelasan tentang barang sitaan Negara dari hasil penangkapan eksplorasi kapal VOC yang karam secara illegal, berapa jumlah dan nilai harta karun tersebut dan disimpan dimana masih dalam misteri.
Saksi bisu benda cagar budaya ternyata faktual dapat 'berbunyi' dan berkata jujur tanpa ada rekayasa maupun kebohongan.

Intelijen Benda Cagar Budaya (Heritage Intelligence)

Cegah tangkal di dalam pelestarian benda cagar budaya sudah waktunya diperkuat, perhitungan secara matematis tentang kekayaan 'adi luhung' bangsa Indonesia belum dapat direalisasikan. Kemampuan IPTEK di dalam kalkulasi sumber daya alam (SDA) kekayaan laut sudah dapat dihandalkan di negri kepulauan ini, padahal dahulu sebelum teori tersebut ada masih merupakan sesuatu yang 'ghaib' diwilayah alam bawah sadar. Sosok manusia dapat terbang Gatot Kaca yang hanya ada dalam cerita pewayangan, tersentak bahwa cerita itu bukan mitos melainkan teknos dengan kemampuan di dalam rekayasa teknologi kapal terbang (Dirgantara Indonesia).
Eksistensi heritage intelligence di dalam melakukan penelitian dan pendokumentasian, serta dapat juga melakukan 'audit' benda cagar budaya, merupakan pemecah dari kebekuan dan kerapuhan mengatasi permasalahan benda cagar budaya. Generasi kedepan perlu diberikan 'menu' visualitas bukan virtualitas. Melalaui intelijen benda cagar budaya sesuatu yang absurd menjadi rasional, investigasi tapak tilas untuk dapat mengumpulkan kembali serpihan sejarah yang tercecer dan hilang. Seperti analogi menjahit pakaian yang sudah usang termakan jaman, memerlukan sentuhan ketekunan penjahit handal. Semoga.***

BAROUSAI, BARUS, ATAU FANSUR: KISAH CEMERLANG DARI BERIBU TAHUN SILAM

BAROUSAI, BARUS, ATAU FANSUR:

KISAH CEMERLANG DARI BERIBU TAHUN SILAM

Kota bandar di tepian pantai barat Sumatra yang berabad lalu menjadi sebuah perkampungan multi-etnis yang penuh guyub, sarat daya tarik bagi para pedagang di hampir seluruh penjuru bumi, juga menjadi pintu masuknya berbagai peradaban dan agama-agama besar di bumi Nusantara itu kini telah sepi.

BARUS saat ini hanya sebuah ibukota Kecamatan, di Kabupaten Tapanuli Selatan, Sumatra Utara. Posisinya berada di pinggir pantai barat Sumatera, sekitar 60 km sebelah utara Sibolga, atau sekitar 414 km dari Medan. Tidak ada yang istimewa. Begitu juga dengan Desa Lobutua, sekitar 4 km ke arah barat dari Barus. Juga layaknya sebuah desa, sepi. Meskipun sesekali para peziarah datang silih-berganti, menapaki sejarah sebuah kota banda yang jauh di awal abad masehi pernah begitu cemerlang dan menggemparkan sekujur bumi.

Dan boleh jadi, Barus adalah satu-satunya kota yang tercatat di dalam buku yang terbit di awal masehi, sehingga menempatkannya sebagai kota tertua di bumi Nusantara. Adalah Claudius Ptolomaios[1], seorang geograf Yunani yang dalam bukunya dari abad ke dua Masehi, Geographike Hyphegesis menuliskan nama negeri Barousai di Chryse Chora (Pulau Emas) yang antara lain oleh van der Meulen disimpulkan sebagai Sumatra[2].

Tapi apa gerangan yang menjadikan kota bandar ini begitu mempesona orang Yunani, China, India, dan bahkan juga para Pharao di Mesir kuno?

Jawabnya tak lain adalah kapur barus (bhs Belanda: kamfer, dan mungkin dari kata kapur yang diucapkan kofur oleh bangsa Arab).[3] Konon, kapur barus asal kota barus inilah yang paling banyak dicari karena kualitasnya yang terbaik, paling laku dan harganya kurang lebih 8 kali lebih mahal daripada kapur-kapur barus asal tempat lain[4]. Dalam catatan pelancong Italia, Marco Polo bahkan disebutkan bahwa, harga kapur barus kala itu setara dengan harga emas dengan berat yang sama[5].

Seorang Belanda pernah menulis bahwa kemenyan dari Barus, telah dipakai sebagai salah satu bahan mengawetkan (membalsem) mayat raja-raja di Mesir sebelum Masehi[6]. Jika dugaan ini benar, maka berarti kota bandar Barus ini sudah ada sejak 5.000 tahun SM. Perkiraan akhir itu, didasarkan pada temuan bahan pengawet dari berbagai mummy Fir'aun Mesir Kuno salah satu pengawetnya menggunakan kanper atau kapur Barus. Sejarawan era kemerdekaan Moh. Yamin, bahkan memperkirakan bahwa, perdagangan rempah-rempah dan tentu saja kamfer, sudah dilakukan pedagang Nusantara sejak 6.000 tahun lalu ke berbagai penjuru dunia.

Hasil penelitian Innis Miller terhadap naskah Historia Naturalis karya Plinius di abad pertama juga sudah menunjukkan bahwa, para pedagang Nusantara pun ternyata sudah menjajakan komoditas mereka sampai ke Asia Barat dan Afrika Timur sejak abad permulaan Masehi[7]. Sementara Prof. Kern[8] pernah menulis bahwa Kota “P’o-lu-chi” yang dimaksud I Tsing di abad ke-7, tidak lain dari Barus[9]. Seorang penyair Arab sebelum Islam, Amru al-Qais (meninggal tahun 530 Masehi), sangat memuji keharuman kafur dalam syair-syairnya[10].

Begitu pentingnya kota Barus ini—mungkin bisa disamakan dengan Paris pada abad modern yang terkenal dengan inovasi parfumnya—maka sejak zaman dulu dalam dunia dagang telah dikenal nama-nama Baros, Balus, Pansur, Fansur, Pansuri[11], Kalasaputra[12], Karpura-dwipa, Barusai, Waru-saka dan lain-lain.

Dan tentu, seperti kata pepatah, ada gula ada semut. Pesona kapur barus dari selatan ini menggoda banyak pendatang. Sebagaimana dicatatan Ptolomaios, selain para penjelajah dari Yunani, juga datang pedagang dari Venesia, India, Arab dan Tiongkok. Selain itu, sekelompok penyebar ajaran Kristen Sekte Nestorian dari Konstantinopel, pusat Kerajaan Byzantium Timur, juga menjejakkan kakinya di Barus. Kelompok itu diperkirakan datang sekira tahun 600 M dan mendirikan gereja pertama di Desa Pancuran, Barus.

Dewan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia juga memercayai sejak tahun 645 Masehi di daerah Barus telah masuk umat Kristen dari sekte Nestorian. Keyakinan tersebut didasarkan pada buku kuno tulisan Shaikh Abu Salih al-Armini. Sementara itu, penjelajah dari Armenia Mabousahl mencatat bahwa pada abad ke-12 telah terdapat Gereja Nestorian.

Lalu datanglah para pedagang Arab memasuki Barus sekira 627-643 M atau sekitar tahun 1 Hijriah, dan menyebarkan agama Islam di daerah itu. Di antaranya Wahab bin Qabishah mendarat di Pulau Mursala pada 627 M. Ada juga utusan Khulafaur Rasyidin, bernama Syekh Ismail akan ke Samudera Pasai dan singgah di Barus, sekira tahun 634 M. Dan sejak itu pula, tercatat bangsa Arab (Islam) mendirikan koloni di Barus. Bangsa Arab menamakan Barus dengan sebutan Fansur atau Fansuri, misalnya oleh penulis Sulaiman pada 851 M dalam bukunya "Silsilatus Tawarikh."

Kedatangan bangsa Arab yang kemudian menyebarkan agama Islam itu juga disebutkan dalam berita-berita Cina, Hsin-Tang-shu[13] (Catatan Dinasti Tang, 618-907), dan Chu-fan-chi[14] (Catatan Negeri-negeri Asing) yang ditulis Chau Ju-kua pada tahun 1225. Di dalam dua kronik Cina itu banyak bercerita tentang Ta-shi, istilah Cina untuk menyebut Arab. (Chu-fan-chi menerangkan bahwa Ta-shi mempunyai seorang Buddha (maksudnya Nabi) yang bernama Ma-ha-mat (Muhammad). Dalam sehari mereka lima kali sembahyang, dan setiap tahun berpuasa selama sebulan penuh. Dinasti Ta-shi ada dua macam, yaitu white-robed Ta-shi (Arab berjubah putih) atau Pon-ni-mo-huan (Bani Marwan, atau Bani Umayyah), serta black-robed Ta-shi (Arab berjubah hitam) yang didirikan raja A-po-lo-pa (Abul-Abbas)[15]. Pada tahun 651 Masehi, raja Ta-shi (Arab) bernama Han-mi-mo-mi-ni mengirimkan utusan ke istana Cina[16]. Hampir dapat dipastikan bahwa nama Han-mi-mo-mi-ni dalam ucapan Cina ini adalah untuk Amir al-Mu’minin, gelar resmi para khalifah Islam, dan “raja Ta-shi” yang mengirimkan utusan itu adalah Khalifah `Utsman ibn Affan yang memerintah dari tahun 644 sampai 656. Hsin-Tang-shu mencatat bahwa pada tahun 674 terdapat pemukiman pedagang Ta-shi (Arab) di Po-lu-shih, daerah pantai barat Sumatera.[17]

Tentu, dapat dibayangkan betapa makmurnya kota Barus pada awal abad masehi ini, dengan penduduk yang sebagian besar terdiri atas kaum pedagang. Pertanyaannya kemudian, siapakah yang menggerakkan semua perdagangan hingga jauh ke negeri seberang itu?

Seorang bekas kontrolir Belanda, G.J.J. Deutz, sewaktu bertugas di Barus,[18] menulis bahwa menurut rakyat setempat di Desa Lobutua pernah didapat penduduk sebuah batu bertulis pada dua bagian. Tetapi sayang, batu itu pada tahun 1857 dipecahkan oleh Raja Barus bernama Mara Pangkat. Pada tahun 1872 Deutz banyak menemukan pecahan batu peninggalan zaman Hindu yang telah dilupakan orang, telah berlumut. Dan baru pada tahun 1932, prasasti itu diterjemahkan Profesor Nila-kanti Sastri dari Universitas Madras.[19]

Prasasti itu menyebutkan bahwa paling sedikit sejak abad ke-11, telah bermukim di kota Barus sebuah koloni bangsa Tamil. Menurut batu Lobutua itu, mereka tergabung dalam sebuah perusahaan bernama “kelompok 500″ yang tidak asing lagi bagi orang-orang India waktu itu. Perusahaan swasta yang mereka wakili, merupakan perusahaan dagang cukup kuat, merdeka dalam tindakan dan tidak gampang tunduk pada salah satu raja yang berkuasa di sekitar Barus. Mereka yang berdiam di Barus inilah yang membeli beberapa hasil dari rakyat—utamanya kapur barus—untuk diekspor ke luar negeri.

Menurut Gnillout Claude[20], Barus adalah sebuah kota kuno di pantai barat Propinsi Sumatera Utara yang terkenal di seluruh Asia, sejak lebih dari seribu tahun, berkat hasil hutannya. Selain itu, nama Barus juga muncul dalam sejarah peradaban Melayu dengan Hamzah Fansuri, penyair mistik terkenal yang baru-baru ini ditemukan kembali makamnya di Mekkah. Sementara itu, tim arkeolog dari Ecole Francaise D’extreme-Orient (EFEO) Perancis bekerjasama dengan Pusat Penelitian Arkeologi Nasional (PPAN) di Lobu Tua-Barus, menemukan bahwa pada sekitar abad 9-12 Masehi, Barus telah menjadi sebuah perkampungan multi-etnis dari berbagai suku bangsa seperti Arab, Aceh, India, China, Tamil, Jawa, Batak, Minangkabau, Bugis, Bengkulu, dan sebagainya. Tim tersebut juga menemukan banyak benda-benda berkualitas tinggi yang usianya sudah ratusan dan bahkan ribuan tahun dan ini menandakan dahulu kala kehidupan di Barus itu sangatlah makmur.

Dan semua kemakmuran itu berkat aroma kapur barus yang diolah dari kayu kamfer. Hanya kini, komoditi yang begitu mempesona di masa silam itu, hingga konon juga dipergunakan bagi pembalseman mayat pada zaman kekuasaan Firaun sejak Ramses II atau sekitar 5. 000 tahun sebelum Masehi itu, kini sudah lama tidak lagi diproduksi

Di komplek makam Syekh Machmud yang tertata rapi dan terletak di Bukit Papan Tinggi dan memang betul-betul tinggi sehingga harus melewati 710 anak tangga ini, menggantung sebuah tulisan, “Beri Salam dan Alas Kaki dibuka.” Seakan mengakhiri sebuah kisah perjalanan sebuah kota bandar di tepian pantai barat Sumatra yang berabad lalu menjadi sebuah perkampungan multi-etnis yang penuh guyub, sarat daya tarik bagi para pedagang di hampir seluruh penjuru bumi, juga menjadi pintu masuknya berbagai peradaban dan agama-agama besar di bumi Nusantara itu kini telah sepi.**



[1] Barus telah disebut oleh Ptolomeus kira kira tahun 150 Masehi. (Kozok, 1991, 14)

[2] W. J. van der Meulen, “Suvarnadvipa and the Chryse Chersonesos”, Indonesia, 18, October 1974, h. 1

[3] Encyclopdeia van Nederlandsch Indie

[4] Ada tiga jenis kapur barus pada saat itu yaitu: Kapur barus dari Kalimantan dan Sumatera (Dryobalanops aromatica), Kapur barus dari China dan Jepang (Cinnamomum Camphora) yang banyak beredar dipasaran dan yang ketiga adalah Blumea balsami- fera, yang diproduksi di China dengan nama kapur barus Ngai. Harga dari kapur barus asal Sumatera ini kira-kira 138 kali lebih mahal dari kapur barus China dan Jepang. (Hobson-Jobson, Glossary of Anglo-Indian Words and Phares)

[5]Travel of Marco Polo,” Buku 3 Bab 9 dan Buku 2 Bab 8 by Marco Polo dan Rustichello of Pisa

[6] Sumatra Benzoe, Disertasi P.H. Brans

[7] J. Innis Miller, The Spice Trade of the Roman Empire, Oxford University Press, London, 1969, terutama Bab “The Cinnamon Route”

[8] Verspreide Geschriften No VI, halaman 15

[9] Po-lu-chi atau Po-lu-suo terkadang sering keliru diterjemahkan dalam text China dengan Bo-si atau Persia. Barus ini juga sering disebut sebagai Bon-cu, Bian-shu atau Bin-cuo. (Roderich Ptak, Possible Chinese Reference to the Barus Area (Ming to Tang) in Claude Guillot (ed.) Histoire de Barus, Sumatera: Le Site de Lobu Tua I, Etudes et Documents, Paris, Cahier d’Archipel 30, 1998, pp. 119-138)

[10] Oliver W. Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1967, terutama Bab 8

[11] Dari Desa Pansur sedikit di utara Barus

[12] Dari kata Kalasan, daerah penghasil kapur barus antara Kota Barus dan Sungai Chenendang

[13] Diterjemahkan oleh Paul Pelliot, “Deux Itineraires de Chine en Inde a la Fin du VIIIe Siecle”, BEFEO, 4, 1904, hal. 132-413

[14] Diterjemahkan oleh Friedrich Hirth dan W. W. Rockhill, Chau Ju-kua: His Work on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, entitled CHU-FAN-CHI, Imperial Academy of Sciences, St.Petersburg, 1911

[15] Lihat: F. Hirth dan W.W.Rockhill, hh. 114-124

[16] Berita ini tercantum dalam kronik Tung-tien buku 193 nomor 22b. Lihat: F.Hirth dan W.W.Rockhill, h. 119

[17] Paul Pelliot, h. 297. Lihat juga W. P. Groeneveldt, Historical Notes on Indonesia and Malaya Compiled from Chinese Sources, Bhratara, Jakarta, cetak ulang 1960, h. 14.

[18] Barus, G.J.J. Deutz, Tijdschr No. 22 tahun 1875

[19] A Tamil Merchant-guild in Sumatera oleh Prof. N. Sastri dalam Tijdschr No 72 tahun 1932

[20] “Lobu Tua Sejarah Barus”, Obor, 2002

Sabtu, 13 September 2008

Energy Security and Southeast Asia: The Impact on Maritime Boundary and Territorial Disputes

Written by Dr Clive Schofield and Dr Ian Storey
Malaysia and Indonesia became embroiled in a war of words over a potentially oil-rich maritime zone off Borneo in March 2005: the Ambalat offshore area. Both sides rushed forces to the disputed area, leading to fears over a potential conflict. Meanwhile, rising oil prices have pushed three disputants in the South China Sea – namely China, the Philippines, and Vietnam – to agree to joint seismic studies in the area, indicating a potential breakthrough in the dispute. The objective of this article is to examine the genesis of the dispute over Ambalat, assess its underlying causes, explore the parties’ competing national maritime jurisdictional claims and address prospects for its resolution. In this context, a brief analysis of the International Court of Justice’s 2002 award of the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands to Malaysia is included. These developments will then be compared and contrasted with recent events in the South China Sea. In particular, the energy security concerns that underpin renewed interest in maritime Southeast Asia will be assessed.
Dr Clive Schofield is a Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, Australia. He specializes in research on the delimitation of international maritime boundaries and related oceans policy.
Dr Ian Storey is an Assistant Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), Honolulu, Hawaii. He specializes in Southeast Asian security issues. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the APCSS, U.S. Pacific Command, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Introduction
Over the past several years, rising global oil prices have focused attention on the issue of energy security – the need for countries to ensure continued access to energy resources, especially oil and gas, both at home and abroad. Nowhere is this concern more acute than in the Asia-Pacific region, home to some of the fastest growing but energy-resource poor countries in the world. Indeed, this is part of the reason why oil prices have risen so quickly: demand for crude oil from China, and increasingly India, has helped push oil prices to record highs. China’s oil consumption rose by 15.8 percent in 2004 alone and shows no sign of slackening.1 For example, Chinese demand for motor vehicles rose by 56 percent in 2002 and a staggering 75 percent in 2003, yet ownership levels stand at only around eight cars per 1,000 people as compared with the global average of 120.2 China, a net oil importer since 1993, is now the second largest consumer of oil after the United States. China’s imports of crude oil have risen from 20 million tons in 1996 to 122 million tons in 2004. Future growth predictions vary, but all show spiraling demand: conservative estimates put the PRC’s crude oil imports at 150 million tons by 2010 and 250-300 million tons by 2020.
In this context, exploration for seabed hydrocarbon resources is often seen as a key way to reduce supply uncertainty, a fact which gives maritime jurisdictional disputes an energy security dimension. Energy security concerns have also translated into increased concern over access to and control over key sea lanes of communication (SLOCs). Additionally, concerned states are reacting to the energy security challenge by taking measures to reduce their dependence through conservation measures and diversification to alternative energy sources. There have also been moves to establish energy stockpiles as a means to limit the impact of possible interruptions to supply.
Gaining access to energy resources can engender both competition and cooperation among states. Many security analysts believe that competition is the norm, and that enhancing energy security is a zero sum game – every barrel of oil that one country acquires is one less for another. There have been several prominent examples of this phenomenon in the Asia-Pacific of late. China and Japan have been actively courting Russia in an effort to tap into its vast oil reserves located in eastern Siberia, a competition Beijing seems to have won. More serious tensions between China and Japan are brewing in the East China Sea, over access to natural gas. Nevertheless, the exploitation of energy resources can also foster cooperation among states.3
This article examines how energy security concerns have impacted maritime boundary and territorial disputes in Southeast Asia. Two case studies are examined. The first involves overlapping maritime boundary claims between Indonesia and Malaysia over Ambalat off the east coast of Borneo. The second examines recent developments in the long-running South China Sea dispute and, in particular, a recent agreement among China, the Philippines, and Vietnam to conduct joint scientific studies as a first step toward ascertaining hydrocarbon deposits in the disputed waters of the Spratly Islands. The first case study highlights competition between states, the second cooperation. However, as each study demonstrates, energy security is but one driver of the region’s complex territorial disputes.
Maritime Boundary Delimitation
The maritime political map of the world, including that of Southeast Asia, is profoundly incomplete, with only about 39 percent of potential maritime boundaries even partially resolved.4 This is largely the consequence of the relatively recent, and significant, advance in national claims to jurisdiction offshore. Coastal states have proved enthusiastic in their adoption of the 200 nautical mile (nm) exclusive economic zone (EEZ) concept as codified in the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), alongside their claims to continental shelf that may extend beyond the 200nm limit.5 As a result, there has been a proliferation in the number of potential maritime boundaries worldwide. Inevitably, a profusion of overlapping jurisdictional claims and offshore boundary disputes have emerged as states seek to secure the maximum maritime entitlements for themselves. The motivation behind delimitation efforts has, unsurprisingly, generally been resource-induced. Traditionally, access to fishery resources represented the key issue. Now, however, energy security considerations tend to be the primary concern.
The LOSC provide minimal guidance, or alternatively great flexibility, as to how maritime boundaries are to be demarcated. Article 15 of the LOSC, dealing with the delimitation of the territorial sea out to 12nm, favors an equidistant line solution unless the states concerned agree otherwise or there exists an “historic title or other special circumstances” in the area to be delimited.6 Yet for the broad resource-oriented zones of sovereign rights, the EEZ and continental shelf, the relevant LOSC provisions, Articles 74 and 83, simply call for agreement to be reached on the basis of international law in order to achieve “an equitable solution”.7 No preferred method of demarcation is indicated, and thus the LOSC’s ‘rules’ are currently open to conflicting interpretation. Additionally, sovereignty disputes, especially over islands, have complicated matters and made a number of conflicting claims to maritime space extremely hard to resolve. This is a major feature of the maritime delimitation scenario in Southeast Asia.
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The Dispute over Ambalat
Indonesia and Malaysia’s dispute over part of the Celebes (Sulawesi) Sea off the east coast of Borneo (Kalimantan to Indonesia), termed “Ambalat” or the “Ambalat offshore area”, emerged in February-March 2005. The dispute came to prominence as a result of the issuing of exploration licenses for two deep-water oil concession blocks, ND6 and ND7, by Malaysia’s national oil company Petronas to its own exploration arm, Petronas Carigali, in partnership with international oil giant Royal Dutch/Shell Group on 16 February 2005. The Malaysian blocks largely overlap with a brace of Indonesian blocks, the Ambalat block and East Ambalat block, which were licensed to Italian oil major ENI and US-based oil multinational Unocal, in December 2004. The dispute is therefore directly linked to issues of energy security in terms of securing seabed hydrocarbon resources for each state.
The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs termed Malaysia’s action “a violation of Indonesia’s sovereignty” and warned Shell to stay out of Indonesian waters.8 Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar reacted by observing that while Kuala Lumpur had indeed received the protest note, Malaysia had itself despatched similar protests to Jakarta over the concessions the Indonesian authorities had issued to ENI and Unocal.9
As diplomatic relations soured, both sides rushed to deploy military forces to the ill-defined disputed area. On March 3, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono ordered the military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia – TNI) to protect Indonesian sovereignty and secure the disputed area, and it was announced that three Indonesian naval vessels were already patrolling the disputed zone. Indonesia’s Eastern Fleet Task Force was then gradually reinforced, eventually bringing the Indonesian Navy’s presence up to eight vessels supported by four F-16 fighter jets which were reposted to Balikpapan in East Kalimantan on March 7.10 Malaysia argued against military escalation with Foreign Minister Albar, stating that Malaysia “will not do anything beyond what we consider as our rightful maritime area in line with the law of the sea. To me, there is no need to send ships”.11 Nonetheless, Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) and marine police vessels were reportedly deployed to the disputed area, and on March 4 the Malaysian media announced that the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) had reinforced its units based in Sabah and Sarawak.12 Subsequently, as diplomatic talks proceeded (see below), the number of Indonesian military vessels in the disputed area was halved, matching the number of Malaysian patrol boats, though suggestions of a “withdrawal” on Indonesia’s part were denied.13
The inherent dangers involved in having rival naval vessels in close proximity to one another, both engaged in patrolling what they regard as ‘their’ maritime space and in a context of strained bilateral relations was amply demonstrated by the collision between Indonesian naval vessel KRI Tedung Naga and Malaysian patrol boat KD Rencong, which caused minor damage to both vessels. Indonesian military sources accused the Malaysians of ramming the Indonesian naval craft. However, Indonesian Navy Chief Admiral Salamet Soebijanto commented that the incident occurred when the Indonesian vessel “tried to drive the Malaysian vessel out of our maritime territory”, indicating a robust, confrontational approach from the TNI.14
The incident provoked an emergency meeting between Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his top military commanders, whom he instructed to refrain from confrontation, so as to allow the two governments to continue their search for a peaceful diplomatic settlement. Malaysian governmental sources also called for calm, with Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Najib Razak stating on April 12 that the navy had been told to “exercise restraint” and adhere to strict rules of engagement, while fellow Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Najib declared that it was not Malaysia’s intent to “edge towards conflict”.15 Nonetheless, both sides declared their intention to continue their patrols in the disputed area in order to emphasize their claims.16 While each claimant’s navy has been instructed to patrol only their ‘own’ waters, the fact remains that an area of overlapping claims exists, bringing the two sides’ naval vessels into close proximity, thus raising the possibility of further incidents occurring.
The dispute has therefore witnessed repeated claims and counter-claims regarding violations of national sovereignty, multiple diplomatic protests, and an alarming military build-up in the disputed area. Furthermore, in Indonesia the dispute has been characterized by popular anti-Malaysian street protests, flag-burnings and inflammatory nationalist commentary in the media. Why has the dispute aroused such passions, especially in Indonesia?
What’s at stake? Energy security and Ambalat
The disputed area, though in deep water, is clearly promising, especially in a commercial environment driven by record crude prices. This factor, combined with advances in drilling technologies, has driven exploration efforts in deep and ultra-deep offshore regions, making areas such as Ambalat attractive where previously interest had been limited. ENI reportedly drilled two test wells in the Ambalat area in late 2004 and made “encouraging” discoveries, leading the Indonesian authorities to provide a very broad estimate of the hydrocarbon deposits in the Ambalat area of between 100 million barrels and one billion barrels of oil.17 Although caution should be used in respect to such estimates in the absence of in-depth exploration work, particularly test drilling, it seems clear that there is significant potential for offshore oil and gas exploitation in the Ambalat offshore area, which is of obvious national interest to both states, especially in the context of the energy security dilemmas they face.
The disputed area is also significant in terms of navigation security, as it lies athwart the SLOC running from the Lombok Strait between Bali and Lombok islands northwards via Indonesia’s designated Archipelagic Sealanes through the Makassar (or Macassar) Strait between the east coast of Borneo and the Molucca Islands in the Celebes Sea. Although much attention has been focused on the Malacca Strait, which is unsurprising since it is estimated to take about 72 percent of eastbound tankers from the Persian Gulf to East Asia, the Lombok/Makassar route is of nearly equal importance from an energy security perspective. This is because while the Malacca Strait dominates in terms of numbers of tankers, the Lombok/Makassar route takes fewer but larger vessels so that in tonnage terms the split between the two routes is roughly even.18
Beyond the oil factor
Although securing access to seabed resources and, to a lesser extent, the strategic dimensions of controlling important sea-lanes are important drivers in the dispute, they do not tell the whole story. The domestic dimensions to the dispute, particularly for Indonesia, cannot be ignored. Ambalat represents the first territorial challenge that the new Indonesian President has faced, and as such has been regarded as a test of his statesmanship and resolve on the sensitive question of national sovereignty. President Yudhoyono has therefore been subject to considerable internal political pressure to take a hard-line position against Malaysia.19 His ordering of the rapid Indonesian military build-up in the region, coupled with statements declaring the non-negotiable nature of Indonesian sovereignty whilst simultaneously calling for a negotiated peaceful resolution to the dispute, reflects the pressures faced by the Indonesian president.
To some extent, the posturing of both sides also serves domestic political ends. This is especially the case in Indonesia, where the media has been swift to latch on to the dispute as a vehicle to promote patriotic fervor, which has served government interests by distracting public attention from the controversial and unpopular fuel price hikes, averaging 29 percent, implemented from March 1, 2005. In a sense, therefore, Ambalat has proved a useful pressure valve for the government from domestic concerns. The furor over Ambalat is reminiscent of President Sukarno’s Konfrontasi campaign of 1963-1965 against the newly created Federation of Malaysia. The issue resulted in popular anti-Malaysian demonstrations around Indonesia, where Malaysian flags were burnt and volunteers trained to ‘protect national sovereignty’ and ‘crush Malaysia’.20
The upsurge in anti-Malaysian sentiment in Indonesia, promoted by inflammatory media coverage, is surprising in the context of the two countries’ friendly bilateral ties. The Ambalat issue has arisen, however, at a time when bilateral relations have been strained as a result of Malaysia’s crack-down against illegal migrants as of March 1, 2005. Many of the estimated one million illegal workers in Malaysia are Indonesian. Considerable ill-feeling has been generated by Kuala Lumpur’s actions, particularly those viewed in Indonesia as Malaysia’s heavy-handed tactics including the imprisonment and whipping of illegal workers prior to deportation. Such actions have prompted Indonesian perceptions, fed by lurid media coverage, of their country and compatriots being humiliated and dishonoured at the hands of ‘Malaysian arrogance’.21 In contrast, the Malaysian media has proved largely quiescent on the issue, and Kuala Lumpur has urged the Indonesian media to tone down their coverage, as Malaysia had no desire to debate the issue via the media.22
All in all, the maritime boundary dispute reflects not only energy security or resource issues, but also the health of the overall bilateral political relationship between the parties. Therefore Ancel’s dictum regarding land boundaries seems just as apt in relation to maritime boundary disputes:

Il n’y a pas de problèmes de frontières. Il n’est que des problèmes de Nations. [There are no boundary problems. There are only problems of nations.]23

Competing claims
As previously noted, the Ambalat offshore area is located in the Celebes Sea, off the east coast of Borneo. It is worth noting in this context that no land territory is at stake, although several erroneous media reports claimed that Indonesia and Malaysia were contesting sovereignty over “Ambalat Island”.24 Unlike the South China Sea island disputes, the Ambalat dispute is non-territorial in nature, and the parties are concerned not with sovereignty per se, but with their overlapping claims to continental shelf and EEZ within which they have specific sovereign rights.
The precise dimensions of the dispute are, however, unclear. While there is unmistakable overlap between competing oil exploration concessions, the dispute extends beyond that confined area. The problem is that while both states have signed and ratified the LOSC and claim 12nm territorial seas and continental shelf and EEZ rights out to 200nm, only one of the parties has defined the extent of its jurisdictional claims.
In 1979 Malaysia issued an official map illustrating the extent of that country’s jurisdiction over territorial sea and continental shelf. Malaysia’s own oil concessions, and thus at least part of the area that Indonesia considers part of its own Ambalat offshore area, fall within Malaysia’s 1979 claim line in the Celebes Sea.25
For its part, Indonesia has yet to specify the precise extent of its continental shelf/EEZ claim. But Indonesia does point out that it, along with a number of Malaysia’s other neighbors, rejected the 1979 Malaysian map. The closest Indonesia has come to articulating its claim was in the case of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan. In that context, Indonesia claimed that the maritime boundary should proceed due east from the terminus of the land boundary on the east coast of Sebatik Island which is divided between the two states.26 Indonesia hasn’t yet specified the revised scope of its claims in the aftermath of the ICJ case.
Implications of the Pulau Sipidan and Pulau Ligitan case
Malaysia’s claims are at least partially based on the fact that on 17 December 2002 the ICJ ruled that sovereignty over the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan, which are located in the vicinity of the Ambalat area, rested with Malaysia. The key factor which led the ICJ to award sovereignty to Malaysia, the Court having rejected both sides’ arguments concerning treaty-based title to the islands, was the fact that Malaysia was able to demonstrate the stronger case in terms of effectivités – acts of administration demonstrating effective exercise of authority over the islands. In particular, Malaysia was able to refer to measures taken by colonial British North Borneo (now Malaysia’s Sabah Province) authorities to regulate and control the collection of turtle eggs on the islands, as well as their construction of lighthouses on Sipadan and Ligitan in 1962 and 1963 respectively, and the subsequent operation of these lighthouses by Malaysian authorities post-independence. Crucially, the Court noted that when these activities were undertaken “neither Indonesia nor its predecessor, the Netherlands, ever expressed its disagreement or protest”. Indonesia’s effectivités, based on the presence of the colonial Dutch and Indonesian navies as well as Indonesian fishermen in the vicinity of the disputed islands, proved less convincing. The ICJ therefore concluded, by 16 votes to one, that on the basis of effectivités, “sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan belongs to Malaysia.”27
Malaysia is likely to argue that the maritime boundary should be determined on the basis of equidistance, giving full effect to Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan. However, although the ICJ determined sovereignty over the islands, no maritime boundary was defined. Thus while Indonesia reluctantly accepts that Sipadan and Ligitan belong to Malaysia, Jakarta is likely to claim that these small islands are nothing more than mere rocks within the meaning of Article 121(3) of the LOSC.28 Indonesia is therefore likely to contest their right to generate anything more in terms of maritime jurisdiction than a 12nm broad territorial sea, and not extended claims to continental shelf or an EEZ. Defining a maritime boundary line is therefore likely to hinge on reaching a compromise over the legal status of these features and their potential impact on an equidistance- based delimitation.
It is worth noting that the Sipadan and Ligitan case still resonates in Indonesia, and this factor contributes to the intense Indonesian reaction to the Ambalat dispute. The loss of territory is keenly felt by any state but especially by Indonesia, still smarting after the violent separation of East Timor in 1999.29 The reaction has been exacerbated by the fact that the Indonesian government and media did not prepare the public for the possibility of defeat, so that the loss was largely unexpected, especially after considerable investments were made in hiring international lawyers and experts to support Jakarta’s case.
The possible loss of isolated, peripheral islands has provoked serious concern in Indonesia, given that the Indonesian archipelago is made up of an estimated 17,000-plus islands of which only about 3,000 are inhabited. Although most Indonesian islands are safely located within the country’s archipelagic baselines, this situation has led to worries over potential loss of territory due to neglect and the Indonesian Navy’s inability to mount a real presence, let alone provide effective enforcement throughout such a vast archipelago.30 One response prompted by the Sipadan and Ligitan case has been a lighthouse-building campaign. Indeed, Indonesia has announced its intent to construct 20 lighthouses in the Ambalat area alone.31 But it is worth noting that construction of a light beacon on Takat [Rock] Unarang on the fringes of the disputed zone was interrupted by Malaysian forces at the outset of the dispute on 20 February 2005, when Indonesian construction workers were arrested and later released.32
Dispute resolution
Despite the initially ominous signs of military build-up, heightened tensions between rival navies in the disputed zone and confrontational rhetoric, there have been encouraging signs on the diplomatic front, with both sides calling for calm and moving to deescalate the situation, for example by ordering their militaries not to take any provocative action. The two countries’ leaders discussed Ambalat by telephone on 7 March 2005 and agreed to resolve the dispute in a “cordial manner” (Badawi) and “amicably” (Yudhoyono).33 The Foreign Ministers of the two countries, Hassan Wirayuda of Indonesia and Syed Hamid Albar of Malaysia, subsequently met for urgent late-night talks on 9 March 2005 and agreed that both sides would “take necessary steps” to ease tensions and establish technical teams to meet on a regular basis in order to manage and ultimately resolve the dispute.34
The technical teams duly met for the first time behind closed doors in Bali, on 22-23 March 2005.35 Subsequently, negotiations have taken place on a regular basis every two months, alternating between states, as follows: on 25-26 May in Langkawi, 25-26 July in Yogyakarta and 27-28 September 2005 in Johor Baru.36 Little information has emerged from these meetings into the public domain, although both sides have agreed to negotiate on the basis of the LOSC, and continue to hold meetings until at least January 2006.37
There are strong reasons to believe that a diplomatic resolution to the dispute will eventually emerge. First among these factors is the fact that a negotiation process is underway, and for all their need to address domestic patriotic sentiments, both leaders and governments have repeatedly stated that a peaceful resolution is sought. For example, President Yudhoyono has stated explicitly that the dispute should be settled peacefully, “without falling into the trap of confrontation, especially armed confrontation” .38 The two countries also have a strong, friendly bilateral relationship to build on. Both are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and signatories to that organization’ s 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, meaning that both are formally committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes. Additionally, they share common religious, linguistic, historical, and cultural traditions. Moreover, the two sides have too much to lose economically were the dispute to escalate. Indeed, on March 23, Rafidah Aziz, Indonesian Minister of International Trade and Industry, declared flatly that the Ambalat dispute “will not affect trade relations”.39
As for the final shape of any agreement, this is, unsurprisingly, difficult to predict given the confidential nature of the bilateral negotiations. Nonetheless, both states have considerable experience in negotiating maritime boundary agreements and thus significant ‘in-house’ expertise and capacity. Additionally, there is a wealth of relevant regional and global state practice to draw upon. The likelihood of Indonesia agreeing to submit the dispute to the ICJ is, however, remote, given Jakarta’s experience in the Sipadan and Ligitan case.
One option that may be worth considering in this context is the possibility of establishing a maritime joint development zone instead of a formal boundary line. This could represent a viable alternative and means to cooperatively access the desired resources without prejudice to either side’s claims and without undue delay, thus effectively shelving the boundary and territorial dispute.40 This method may ultimately be applied in the Ambalat area, although Indonesia has, at least initially, stated its preference for a demarcation line solution.41
A Breakthrough in the South China Sea Dispute?
Rising global energy prices represent one factor that has contributed to a potential breakthrough in Southeast Asia’s most complex and hitherto tense set of territorial disputes – the South China Sea dispute. Developments over the past 12 months suggest that, for the first time ever, the political will may exist to set aside overlapping sovereignty claims and pursue joint exploration with a view to conducting joint exploitation of seabed resources further down the line. The new initiatives have been spearheaded by the Philippines and China, two countries for whom energy security has become a pressing concern. More than 60 percent of China’s crude oil is imported from countries in the Middle East. The PRC is keen to lessen its dependence on Middle Eastern oil both because of political instability in the area and US military preponderance. Moreover, Chinese oil imports from the Middle East (as well as Africa) have to pass through the Malacca or Lombok Straits, the narrow body of water separating Indonesia and Malaysia. For Beijing, this represents a strategic vulnerability because China’s navy is not nearly strong enough to protect the SLOCs that pass through the strait – a vulnerability dubbed by the Chinese media the “Malacca dilemma”.42 Chinese strategic analysts worry that in the event of heightened tensions or conflict, say over Taiwan, countries that possess stronger naval forces would be able to disrupt oil flows to the PRC. This would have a negative impact not only on China’s war-fighting capabilities, but also on the country’s continued economic growth on which the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) depends. In order to enhance its energy security, the PRC is diversifying the sources of its oil imports, is building a strategic oil reserve, and plans to increase nuclear and renewable energy power generation. Southeast Asia is one region that China has identified as an important source of energy resources. For the Philippines, rising oil prices are exacerbating the country’s dire economic situation, particularly its ballooning national debt. The concern is so acute that in August 2005, Philippine National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales declared that the spiraling cost of crude oil posed a national security threat.43 However, as with the Ambalat dispute, it is important to note that factors other than energy security are also at work, particularly political factors. Recent developments in the South China Sea dispute are partly a result of China’s “smile diplomacy”, a campaign aimed at reassuring the ten countries that make up ASEAN that China’s rise is peaceful and beneficial to all its neighbors.44 During the 1990s, China’s behavior in the South China Sea was seen as a litmus test of how a powerful China may act toward its neighbors in the future. By pursuing cooperative ventures in the South China Sea, Beijing hopes to underline its “peaceful rise” thesis.
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Background to the Dispute

The South China Sea is home to a number of territorial disputes, both bilateral and multilateral. Foremost among these is the Spratly Islands dispute. Located in the southern part of the South China Sea, the Spratly archipelago is composed of approximately 170 geographical features of which only 36 can technically be called islands (or rocks) because they are naturally above water at high tide.45 Six governments make territorial claims in the Spratlys. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam lay claim to virtually all the geographical features on the grounds of discovery, history, and occupation. The Philippines and Malaysia claim parts of the group on the basis of proximity and the continental shelf principle. Brunei claims only one island, also using the continental shelf principle. However, none of the claims are very substantive, and it is unlikely that any of the disputants would take their claims to the ICJ. Instead, each of the claimants, except for Brunei, has sought to consolidate its claims by occupying geographical features, building structures, and stationing military personnel on them. The Spratlys have been the scene of one major military clash (between China and Vietnam in 1988, when over 70 Vietnamese naval personnel were killed), and scores of minor incidents between the various disputants.
The Spratlys have minimal intrinsic value, but sovereignty is contested for two other reasons. First, the seabed below the Spratlys is reputed to be rich in oil, gas, and various mineral resources. Estimates concerning potential oil and gas reserves vary considerably, from a low of 1-2 billion barrels to a high of 225 billion barrels. Because of tensions in the area, energy companies have been prevented from conducting comprehensive surveys in the Spratlys, leaving all estimates highly uncertain. However, the perception, based on the presence of productive oil and gas fields in the littoral areas of the South China Sea, is that the Spratlys sit atop lucrative hydrocarbon deposits. Sovereignty is also contested because the Spratlys occupy an important strategic location, close to vital SLOCs that link the Pacific and Indian Oceans. More than a quarter of the world’s trade traverses through these SLOCs, including 70 percent of Japan’s energy needs and 65 percent of China’s.
During the early 1990s the Spratlys emerged as a source of serious interstate tension, primarily because China, freed from the “threat from the north” posed by the Soviet Union, moved to expand its presence in the area. China formally asserted its sovereignty claims in the Spratlys in 1992 (claiming practically the entire South China Sea), prompting ASEAN – whose membership includes four of the disputants – to issue a Declaration on the South China Sea which urged all claimants to resolve the issue peacefully.46 The year 1995 marked a turning point in the dispute, when Chinese-built structures were discovered on Mischief Reef, a small atoll located 135 nm from Palawan Island and well within the Philippines’ claimed 200 nm EEZ. China’s occupation of Mischief Reef sparked a crisis between Beijing and Manila. The Philippines sought, and received, a united stand from its ASEAN partners in the form of a statement expressing “serious concern” at the developments. In November 1998, China upgraded its structures on Mischief Reef into a permanent two-storey building complete with gun emplacements and a helicopter landing-pad.47 This time, however, bickering among the ASEAN states caused by the socio-economic fallout from the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis prevented the organization from presenting a united front.
In the wake of the Mischief Reef Incident, the ASEAN states attempted to ease tensions with the PRC in the South China Sea through the implementation of confidence-building measures (CBMs). One of the first CBMs was a code of conduct between the Philippines and China, signed in August 1995. A few months later, the Philippines and Vietnam signed a similar agreement. These codes enjoyed mixed success, to say the least, and failed to prevent a number of tense stand-offs between the naval forces of the Philippines and China in the second half of the 1990s, and, as mentioned earlier, the upgrading of China’s structures on Mischief Reef in 1998. Nevertheless, in 1996 ASEAN resolved to formulate a regional code of conduct for the South China Sea, which it hoped the PRC would accede to. Negotiations between ASEAN and China dragged on for several years, hindered by Beijing’s objections to some of the proposed code’s organizing principles and its geographical scope (for instance, China did not want the code to include the Paracels, a group of islands in the northern part of the South China Sea where China had dislodged South Vietnamese forces in 1974 – however, Vietnam still claims sovereignty of the Paracels and wanted the group included in the code). Finally, on 4 November 2002, ASEAN and China signed a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (known as the DoC).48
The 2002 DoC: Strengths and Weaknesses
The DoC builds on earlier declarations and codes of conduct. The signatory parties agree to resolve the territorial dispute by peaceful means, without resort to force or threat of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations, and with respect to international law. According to paragraph five of the DoC, the parties “undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability” – as such, the DoC prohibits claimants from occupying presently unoccupied geographical features. However, it does not prohibit claimants from upgrading existing facilities on presently occupied features. Paragraph five also identifies five kinds of cooperative activities; parties are allowed to undertake, either bilaterally or multilaterally, the following CBMs: marine environmental protection; marine scientific research; safety of navigation and communication at sea; search and rescue operations; and combating transnational crime.
The DoC suffers from a number of weaknesses. It is neither a binding treaty, nor a formal code of conduct. The DoC has no teeth: it does not enumerate sanctions in the event of an infringement, and does not have a geographical scope. Moreover, one of the claimants – Taiwan – is not a party to the DoC because Beijing regards Taiwan as part of the PRC while the ASEAN states, in accordance with the One China policy, do not recognize Taiwan as an independent sovereign state. Yet despite these flaws the DoC represents a political statement meant to reduce tensions in the region and engage in cooperative activities. It is also an agreement to work toward a formal and binding code of conduct. This commitment was reaffirmed in the October 2003 ASEAN-China Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity and the subsequent November 2004 Plan of Action to implement the 2003 Declaration.49
Between November 2002 and early 2004 all parties, by and large, adhered to the provisions of the DoC and tensions in the area eased. However, beginning in March 2004 a series of events occurred which led many to question the efficacy of the DoC. In early April Taiwanese authorities constructed a “bird watching shelter” near the largest of the Spratly Islands, Itu Abu (occupied by Taiwan). Vietnam accused Taiwan of violating the DoC (although Taiwan is not a party to the agreement).50 Several weeks later Hanoi raised the ire of Beijing and Manila by conducting a seven-day cruise for government officials and tourists to geographical features under its control in the Spratlys. Both Manila and Beijing protested the cruise as an infringement of the DoC’s self-restraint clause.51 In response, Hanoi declared that it had “indisputable sovereignty” over the Spratlys and that the cruise was part of “normal” activities.52 A month later Vietnam came under further criticism from China when it announced plans to renovate an airstrip on Big Spratly Island with a view to beginning commercial flights in 2005.53 By establishing regular air and sea links to the Spratlys, Vietnam was aiming to strengthen its effectivités over the islands. Vietnam rejected China and the Philippines’ protests on the grounds that paragraph five of the DoC does not specify in detail which kinds of activities are deemed to “complicate or escalate” the dispute. Nor does the DoC forbid Vietnam from upgrading its airstrip on the Big Spratly Island.
China, Philippines, and Vietnam Agree to Conduct Joint Seismic Studies
The territorial dispute took an interesting turn in August 2004, when Manila announced that, in a departure from previous practice, it would no longer oppose exploration for hydrocarbon deposits in the disputed waters of the South China Sea.54 This announcement paved the way for a landmark agreement between Manila and Beijing to conduct seismic studies in the South China Sea, in order to identify areas for oil and gas exploration. The agreement – known as the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) – was signed during Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s state visit to the PRC during 1-3 September 2004, and provides for a three-year study to be undertaken by the Philippines’ state-owned oil company Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and China’s state-run China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).55 Manila emphasized the JMSU was a “pre-exploration” study and would not involve any drilling in disputed waters. According to Manila, the JMSU can be classified as “marine scientific research” and is therefore covered by paragraph five of the DoC.56
The Sino-Philippine JMSU represented a 180-degree turn on the part of Manila, which had previously advocated a united-ASEAN front in the face of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. Several reasons account for this change of policy. First, as mentioned earlier, Manila has identified the spiraling cost of oil as a threat to national security. Given that oil prices are likely to remain high for the foreseeable future, Manila believes it is imperative to exploit energy resources in its own backyard. Second, as Ralf Emmers has argued, by the turn of the twenty-first century, the South China Sea dispute had reached a status quo, with none of the disputants possessing the military power to enforce their claims.57 However, since the early 1990s China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been undergoing a major modernization program, resulting in both quantitative and qualitative improvements.58 Within a decade or less, the PLAN will be in a far stronger position to enforce China’s sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. Before this occurs, it’s better to lock the PRC into joint exploration and exploitation agreements. Third, since coming to power in 2001, President Arroyo has made rejuvenation of the Philippine economy her government’s number one priority. Increasingly Manila views the PRC as the regional economic dynamo that can help pull the Philippines out of its economic malaise. The JMSU can thus be seen as a measure aimed at improving Sino-Philippine relations, long strained by the Spratlys dispute.

Initially Vietnam condemned the JMSU as a violation of the DoC. However, it later entered into negotiations with the Philippines and China, and on 14 March 2005 the three state-owned oil companies of the PRC, the Philippines, and Vietnam (PNOC, CNOOC, and PetroVietnam) signed a new JMSU to jointly prospect for oil and gas in the disputed waters of the South China Sea.59 Although the JMSU is a secret document, according to China’s People’s Daily the three-year agreement covers an area of 143,000 square kilometers and will cost an estimated US$15 million (to be split equally among the three companies).60 According to officials at the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the JMSU provides for a Joint Operating Committee (JOC) composed of executives from the three state-owned energy companies, plus technical experts, and will meet three times per year.61 In August 2005 the JOC awarded its first contract to China Oilfield Services Ltd. (COS), a subsidiary of CNOOC, to undertake a two-dimensional seismic exploration project.62 Further contracts are expected to be awarded soon. After the three-year study is complete, the JOC will review the data collected and suggest policy options for further exploration and possibly exploitation.
President Arroyo hailed the JMSU as a “historic diplomatic breakthrough for peace and security in the region” while Foreign Secretary Alberto Romulo called it “a model setting approach for the complex issues in the South China Sea, and a step that brings the parties closer toward the peaceful permanent and complete resolution of the territorial disputes and overlapping maritime boundaries in the area”.63 China’s People’s Daily lauded the agreement as putting into practice the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s proposal to shelve sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea and engage in joint exploration and exploitation.64
Does the JMSU represent a profound breakthrough in the long-running territorial dispute? At this stage it is too early to tell. On the one hand, the JMSU represents a willingness to put aside competing sovereignty claims and engage in joint exploration for much needed energy resources. As such, it is an important CBM envisaged by the 2002 DoC. An encouraging sign is that none of the other disputants – i.e. Malaysia, Brunei, or Taiwan – has objected to the JMSU (according to the Philippine DFA, all ASEAN members have been briefed on the agreement’s contents).65 On the other hand, the three disputants have emphasized that the JMSU is a commercial agreement that does not change their basic territorial claims. The real difficulties will come after the three-year survey is completed, and the disputants have to decide how the project is to move forward. The difficult questions that they will have to deal with will include: How is joint exploitation to be conducted? How are costs and profits to be shared? What role should the other disputants play? How these questions are answered will decide whether the South China Sea will become a “sea of friendship and cooperation” or a continued source of interstate tension. The exigencies of energy security are sure to play an important role in the positions the disputants ultimately adopt.
Conclusions
These disputes highlight enduring regional sensitivities regarding boundary and sovereignty issues, as well as heightened concerns over energy security. Maritime boundary demarcation lines define the limits of jurisdiction over valuable offshore areas and thus ownership of key resources – a crucial consideration in the context of high oil prices and energy security vulnerabilities.
It is worth observing, however, that energy security is only one factor. International boundaries have great psychological and political significance. States regard their international boundaries as representing their territorial integrity and sovereignty, and therefore view their borders as a crucial ingredient in their continuing legitimacy. This fact partly explains the vigorous reaction by states to seemingly innocuous border incidents – as demonstrated in the Ambalat case, where two ostensibly friendly neighbors and ASEAN partners have proved willing to deploy their armed forces to confront one another in order to safeguard themselves against perceived threats to their territorial integrity and rights to key resources. This scenario has long been the norm in the considerably more complex South China Sea environment.
In maritime boundary disputes, the lure of potential access to seabed oil and gas resources often plays a dual role. On the positive side, it can be a motivating factor, prompting a desire to resolve the dispute swiftly so that exploration can proceed as soon as possible, especially when oil prices are high. On the other hand, the possible presence of such resources can serve as an impediment to dispute resolution, since often neither side is willing to concede what it regards as its own legitimate rights; there are concerns that if a compromise boundary line were drawn through the zone of overlapping claims, the bulk of the resources at stake could end up on the ‘wrong’ side of the line – a consideration which provides a strong motivation to enter joint development.
Progress appears to have been made with regard to the Ambalat dispute. But in the South China Sea, still caution is advisable; it remains to be seen whether the new tripartite agreement to jointly explore offshore resources in disputed waters signifies that, at last, the political will exists to shelve the sovereignty claims and proceed with joint development. The early signs are, however, remarkably positive.
Endnotes

1. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2005, p.9.
2. “Dream Machines”, The Economist, 4 June 2005, pp. 23-4.
3. Clive Schofield, “Dividing the Resources of the Timor Sea: A matter of life and death for East Timor”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.27, No.2 (August 2005), pp. 255-280.
4. Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2005, pp.217-218.
5. United Nations, The Law of the Sea, United Nations, New York, 1983 (hereinafter, LOSC). It has been calculated that national claim to maritime jurisdiction could encompass as much as 49.5% of the world ocean, should every coastal State make maximum possible claims. See: Prescott and Schofield, 2005, pp.8 and 30.
6. LOSC, Article 15.
7. LOSC, Article 74 and 83.
8. “Indonesia Protests Malaysia's Oil Pacts”, Associated Press, 25 February 2005.
9. “Areas in Sulawesi Sea within Malaysia’s borders”, Malaysia Star, 2 March 2005.
10. “Air Force sends four F-16s to Ambalat”, Tempo, 7 March 2005.
11. “Malaysia to talk to Indonesia over oil dispute”, Reuters, 3 March 2005.
12. Bill Guerin, “Sulawesi Sea row dredges up defenses”, Asia Times Online, 9 March 2005.
13. “Indonesian President meets Malaysian FM”, Xinhuanet, 11 March 2005.
14. “RI, KL warships collide in Ambalat”, The Jakarta Post, 10, April 2005.
15. “Maritime Dispute with Indonesia”, Straits Times, 12 April 2005.
16. “Malaysia military to continue patrols in disputes oil concession areas”, Xinhua News Agency, 3 March 2005; “Indonesian warships sail into sea dispute”, Reuters, 3 March 2005; “KL tells navy to show restraint after incident”, Straits Times, 12 April 2005.
17. “BP Migas questioned role over Ambalat”, Jakarta Post, 17 March 2005; and, “Eni finds oil in area claimed by Indonesia, Malaysia”, Jakarta Post, 18 March 2005.
18. Very large crude carriers (VLCCs) of over 250,000dwt favour the Lombok/Makassar route because of depth and draft considerations. The Malacca Strait has a least depth of around 25m and International Maritime Organization (IMO) rules relating to the Malacca and Singapore Straits require under keel clearance of 3.5m. Most VLCCs, when fully laden, will fall outside these draft restrictions. See: Sam Bateman, “Sea Lane Security”, Maritime Studies, No.128, January-February 2003, pp.19-20.
19. See, for example, “President told to take stern action against Malaysia”, Jakarta Post, 9 March 2005.
20. See, for example, Dandhy Dwi Laksono, “Crush Malaysia, whose agenda?”, Jakarta Post, 21 March 2005.
21. See, for example, Kalinga Seneviratne, “From gunboat diplomacy to talks over an island”, Asia Times Online, 18 March 2005, and “Indonesia tests ties with ‘arrogant’ neighbor”, Asia Times Online, 19 March 2005.
22. For example, Malaysian Foreign Minister Albar stated on 10 March that the dispute was being blown out of proportion by the Indonesian media who had “initiated a tremendous raising of feelings” that was “not beneficial”. Quoted in “Rabid nationalism may scuttle diplomacy”, Laksamana.net, 10 March 2005.
23. Quoted in Prescott and Schofield, 2005, p.246.
24. See, for example, “Navy prepares force for Ambalat”, Tempo, 7 March 2005; “Rabid nationalism may scuttle diplomacy”, Laksamana.net, 10 March 2005; and, Kalinga Seneviratne, “From gunboat diplomacy to talks over an island”, Asia Times Online, 18 March 2005. However, see later comment re: Takat Unarang.
25. Director of National Mapping Malaysia, Map showing territorial waters and continental shelf boundaries of Malaysia, Sheet 2, Mercator projection, scale 1:1.5 million at 5°30’ N. Kuala Lumpur, 1979. See also, Renate Haller-Trost, The Contested Maritime and Territorial Boundaries of Malaysia, Kluwer Law International, London, 1998, pp.7-8 and 13-22.
26. For analysis of the land boundary see J.R.V.Prescott, H.J.Collier and D.F.Prescott, Frontiers of Asia and Southeast Asia, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1977, p.90.
27. See Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia ), ICJ website.
28. LOSC, Article 121(1) provides that “An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide”, while Article 121(3) states that, “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf”.
29. For more background detail on this issue see, for example, Schofield, “Dividing the Resources of the Timor Sea: A matter of life and death for East Timor”, 2005, pp. 255-280.
30. Richel Langit, “Indonesia: Islands in the storm”, Asia Times, 21 December 2002.
31. “Indonesia to continue lighthouse construction in disputed area”, Xinhuanet, 14 March 2005, www.chinaview. cn.
32. As previously noted, there is no “Ambalat Island”. Takat [Rock] Unarang is the nearest thing to land territory at stake in the dispute. However, this feature is, at best, a low-tide elevation rather than even a rock, let alone an island within the meaning of Article 121 of the LOSC. If this is the case, given its position 10nm from Indonesia’s low-water line or ‘normal’ baselines and 12nm from the nearest point on Malaysia’s, only the former is in a position to use Takat Unarang as a basepoint, in line with Article 13 of the LOSC dealing with low-tide elevations, and even then only for a claim to a 12nm territorial sea. However, there are also reports that Takat Unarang is no more than a submerged rock and therefore not a valid basepoint for generating maritime claims to jurisdiction. See Prescott and Schofield, 2005, p.451-452.
33. Bill Guerin, “Sulawesi Sea row dredges up defenses”, Asia Times Online, 9 March 2005; and, “Border dispute to be settled amicably: President”, Jakarta Post, 7 March 2005.
34. “Indonesia, Malaysia pledge peaceful end to territorial row”, Channel News Asia, 9 March 2005.
35. “Ambalat talks held out of public view”, The Jakarta Post, 23 March 2005.
36. “Indonesia Teruskan Perundingan Soal Ambalat”, Suara Karya, 8 November 2005 [in Bahasa Indonesia].
37. Suara Pembaruan Daily, 15 October 2005 [in Bahasa Indonesia]. The authors wish to thank Andi Arsana of the School of Surveying and Spatial Information at the University of New South Wales, Australia, for his assistance with translations from Bahasa Indonesia.
38. Bill Guerin, “Sulawesi Sea row dredges up defenses”, Asia Times Online, 9 March 2005.
39. “Ambalat Issue has no effect on M’sia-RI Trade Relations”, Antara, 23 March 2005.
40. Clive Schofield and Andi Arsana, “Ambalat revised: The way forward?”, Jakarta Post, 9 June 2005.
41. Suara Pembaruan Daily, 15 October 2005 [in Bahasa Indonesia].
42. Ian Storey, “China seeks to reduce its dependence on Strait of Malacca”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 2005.
43. “Soaring price of oil poses a security threat in RP”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 16 August 2005.
44. Membership of ASEAN includes Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
45. Daniel J. Dzurek, The Spratly Islands Dispute: Who’s On First?, International Boundaries Research Unit Maritime Briefing, Vol.2, No.1, 1996, p.1.
46. This document can be seen here
47. For a longer account of the Mischief Reef Incident see Ian Storey, “Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines, and the South China Sea Dispute”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 21, no. 1 (April 1999), pp. 95-118.
48. This document can be seen here
49. These two documents can be seen here and here
50. “Vietnam condemns Taiwan over Spratlys construction” , Agence France Presse, Hong Kong, 31 March 2004.
51. See “60 Viet tourists visit to Spratlys raises furor”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 20 April 2004.
52. Ibid.
53. “Vietnam rebuilds Spratly airport”, BBC website, 14 May 2004.
54. “RP won’t block oil searches in Spratlys”, Today, 23 August 2004.
55. “Philippines, China to study potential oil deposits in South China Sea”, Agence France Presse, Hong Kong, 2 September 2004.
56. Interview with senior official in the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, August 2005.
57. Ralf Emmers, Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and Diplomatic Status Quo, Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies (IISS) Working Paper No. 87, September 2005.
58. See Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “China emerges as a maritime power”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, October 2004.
59. “Three nations sign pact for joint Spratlys survey”, Straits Times, 15 March 2005.
60. “Turning ‘sea of disputes’ into ‘sea of cooperation’”, People’s Daily, 16 March 2005.
61. Interview with senior official in the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, August 2005.
62. “China, the Philippines and Vietnam work on disputed South China Sea”, Xinhua News Agency, 26 August 2005. For a technical explanation of the evolution of seismic technology and the distinctions between 2D, 3D and 4D seismic survey techniques see the Society of Petroleum Engineers website.
63. “More on the PRC, Philippines, Vietnam sign joint South China Sea oil accord”, Agence France Presse.
64. “All-win rational choice”, People’s Daily, 18 March 2005.
65. Interview with senior official in the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, August 2005.

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